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ABSTRACT 
U.S. Counter IED (C-IED) efforts continue to be directed at combating 
IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, as terrorists broaden their target 
selection standards, so too should the U.S. broaden its C-IED efforts.  IED 
attacks and IED terror campaigns are currently occurring all over the world, yet 
America is unprepared to prevent an IED terror campaign in the homeland.  
This thesis will propose how to prevent a domestic IED terror campaign by 
utilizing the intelligence triggers indications and warnings, and open source 
intelligence as well as placing increased emphasis on the importance of 
international and interagency cooperation.   
The benefits of this thesis could be the development of a methodology for 
intelligence sharing between federal agencies, state authorities, and local U.S. 
law enforcement personnel against an aspect of terrorism that has not yet 
affected America. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE PROBLEM 
Since September 11, 2001, America has been facing new and difficult 
challenges to its national security, specifically homeland defense and security.  
Homeland security issues have transformed from defending against conventional 
militaries and nation states into defending against unconventional threats 
executed by non nation state actors.  America must prepare to defend against 
threats and terror campaigns executed by determined terrorists, both foreign and 
domestic.  On 9/11, it was made abundantly clear that America was no longer 
protected by two vast oceans and two friendly neighbors.  Terrorists are capable 
of executing catastrophic attacks or terror campaigns on American soil using 
resources and planning from within the continental United States.  For a possible 
weapon or tactics, terrorists need to look no further than the headline news to 
determine that an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) would be an ideal weapon 
in launching a terror campaign within the United States.  Amazingly terrorists only 
need the Internet and a few household chemicals as a resource to execute IED 
attacks. 
The IED is most commonly defined as “a device placed or fabricated in an 
improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or 
incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It 
may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary 
components.”1   
With the success insurgents have achieved using IEDs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the popularity of these devices has spread rapidly around the 
Middle East and throughout the world.  “January 2007 witnessed the highest 
                                            
1  Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
April 12, 2001 (as amended through June 13, 2007), 252. 
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number of worldwide IED incidents (outside Iraq) with 305.”2  It is not difficult to 
understand why IEDs have increased in popularity as the weapon of choice by 
terrorists.  “They are cheap, easy to make and hide, and their employment tactics 
techniques and procedures are very flexible and difficult to counter.”3  The 
execution of an IED terror campaign within the United States would not require a 
large number of incidents or fatalities in order to paralyze the nation with fear; 
“the sense of vulnerability from an unseen enemy created by the employment of 
IEDs provides a much greater effect.”4  The bottom line is America is not 
prepared to prevent an IED terror campaign and the threat is all too real.   
1. Literature Review 
There is little unclassified scholarly work done on how information and 
intelligence designed to combat IEDs can be gathered and shared between 
Federal, State, local, and tribal personnel.  Despite this lack of scholarly research 
on that specific topic, certain schools of thought can assist in understanding why 
information is not being shared, and what elements of cooperation, if properly 
exercised, can assist U.S. authorities in preventing an IED terror campaign in 
America. 
Since IEDs are the leading killer of coalition soldiers in Iraq, the 
Department of Defense has expended much effort and resources to defeat these 
lethal devices.5  Recognizing that IEDs were a new threat facing service 
                                            
2  Robin Keesee, “JIEDDO Cooperative Opportunities International Acquisition Forum – XXII: 
Attack the Network-Defeat the Device-Train the Force,” Joint Improvised Explosive Defeat 
Organization, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ic/IAF%20XXII%202007/JIEDDO%20Coop%20Opportunities.ppt#1 
(accessed October 19, 2007). 
3  Christopher Lepore, "The Building of an Improvised Explosive Device Management System 
for the Consolidation, Archiving, Analysis, and Central Access of Multiple Source IED 
Information" (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 1. 
4 Ibid., 2.  
5  Anne Plummer, "Deadly Threat of Explosive Devices in Iraq Prompts Secrecy Debate," 
Inside the Pentagon 20, no. 47, 2004. 
http://insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAG
ON-20-47-17 (accessed October 19, 2007). 
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members in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD created the Army IED Task Force in 
October 2003, which has since evolved.  In January 2006, DoD created the Joint 
IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to manage IED information and develop 
countermeasures “in support of the Combatant Commanders’ and their 
respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat the Improvised Explosive Devices 
as weapons of strategic influence.”6  DoD efforts to combat IEDs will and should 
continue to be focused primarily on Iraq and Afghanistan; however, little effort 
has been made to develop effective measures to prevent IEDs from being used 
in the United States.   
Terrorist use of crude IEDs have been documented in America, but in 
most cases over the past few decades they have been used as a weapon of the 
anti-abortion or environmentalist movement activists and not as indiscriminant or 
random weapons of terror.  However, it is likely only a matter of time before 
sophisticated terrorist movements use these lethal devices indiscriminately in 
America against American citizens.7  
Unfortunately, the information from all the DoD research and development 
done on understanding and defeating these devices abroad remains stove piped 
and is not fully shared with all appropriate Department of Homeland Security and 
law enforcement organizations responsible for protecting the homeland.  Vast 
amounts of intelligence that could assist in preventing an IED terror campaign is 
available using open sources such as the Internet, yet leveraging these open 
sources has not been fully absorbed by domestic intelligence or law enforcement 
personnel.  Obviously not all Department of Defense Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures are applicable to defending America against an IED threat, but 
sharing available JIEDDO knowledge as well as knowledge and assets from the 
                                            
6  United States Department of Defense, “Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat,” 
Directive 2000.19. Washington, D.C. June 27, 2005. 
7  "IED Indicators," July 7, 2005, https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/csis/nps21-072505-
02.pdf (accessed August 5, 2007). 
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intelligence community would be a valuable start and could significantly narrow 
this intelligence gap and help prevent an IED terror campaign in America.   
This section will discuss three schools of thought that contribute to 
understanding substandard information sharing.  The first school of thought is 
primarily concerned with organizational politics, the second school deals with the 
ability to share information with other organizations with personnel with different 
levels of security clearances.  The third school of thought is concerned with 
ineffective communication between involved organizations.  Existing research 
literature regarding the first school of thought states the political and 
organizational failure to share information is attributed to factors such as 
“agencies generally engaging in cooperative action only when there is also some 
reasonable expectation of achieving self interest goals…internal benefits, 
improve its public image, or expand its influence over others.”8   
The second school of thought is concerned with the ability to share secret 
information among organizations where individuals possess different levels of 
security clearances.  Sharing secret intelligence with agencies or individuals who 
do not hold the appropriate clearances and whose facilities lack the appropriate 
security accreditation is an aspect of security that has and will likely always be 
present.  However, literature by the United States government accountability 
office studying this problem suggests the issue can be overcome in regard to 
homeland security as evidenced by the Coast Guard’s efforts with regard to 
maritime security.9   
The third school of thought of ineffective communication has been 
addressed by existing literature relating directly to combating the IED threat 
within the Department of Defense.  “The quick and informal nature in which many 
                                            
8  Sharon S. Dawes, "Interagency Information Sharing: Expected Benefits, Manageable 
Risks," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 15, no. 3 (1996): 380. 
9  United States Government Accountability Office, “Maritime Security: Information-Sharing 
Efforts are Improving,” (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, 
2006), www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-933T. 
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of the counter IED cells were created was not conducive to the long term storage 
and retrieval of the information for future use.”10  Because of the hasty manner in 
which these organizations and task forces were created to meet the rapidly 
growing threat they were not built to compliment each other and often existed 
without the knowledge of other organizations doing similar research and analysis.  
“At one point over 300 organizations were producing products focused on the 
counter IED effort” but due to ineffective communication these organizations 
were not learning from and building off the efforts of each other. 11   
Since 2006 JIEDDO has assumed the role “as the focal point for all efforts 
in the Department of Defense to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices” and there 
has been significant progress made in sharing this valued information.12  This 
improvement is promising, but again these efforts are focused on protecting 
service members overseas from IEDs, not on protecting citizens in America from 
terrorists using IEDs.  
The problem addressed in this thesis is the lack of preventive planning, 
coordination, and overall defense against an IED terror campaign in the United 
States.  It would be beneficial to have systems in place for our government and 
law enforcement personnel to prevent, and if necessary, respond to an IED terror 
campaign before our citizens or law enforcement personnel are attacked and 




                                            
10 Lepore, 5. 
11 Ibid., 5. 
12  “Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat,” Directive 2000.19.  
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 This thesis will answer the following questions: 
 1)  Have any terrorist or criminal organization shown interest in using IEDs 
in America? 
 2)  What lessons can be learned and applied from instances of IED terror 
campaigns against other nations? 
 3)  Should, or can, indications and warnings (I&W) and open source 
intelligence (OSINT) provide a significant piece of the answer to combating a 
domestic IED threat? 
4)  Would a domestic IED terror campaign be more likely or lethal without 
effective international and interagency cooperation? 
 These questions will be revisited and answered in the concluding chapter 
complimented with recommendations on how to prevent an IED terror campaign 
in the United States. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
 This thesis will examine the evolution of the IED terror threat, previous 
counter IED efforts (C-IED) both foreign and domestic, and a proposed solution 
to prevent an IED terror campaign in the United States.  The organization is 
intended to make the reader aware of the broad global IED threat by discussing 
the background of the threat and C-IED efforts in foreign countries and America. 
The focus will then narrow to how the U.S. federal, state, and local authorities 
can prevent an IED terror campaign in America.  Chapter II is designed to help 
readers understand the threat focusing on asymmetric warfare, economical 
factors, effectiveness of the device, psychological, and propaganda effects of 
IEDs, recruitment factors, as well as explaining why it will likely happen in 
America.  Chapter III discusses the IED terror threat and response in Britain, 
Spain, and Israel where IEDs are commonly used by terrorists.  Chapter IV 
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covers the evolution of U.S. C-IED efforts for the military and for homeland 
security.  Chapter V details the recommendations and the conclusion by 
discussing intelligence triggers, interagency and international cooperation, 
answering the posed research questions and instilling a sense or urgency to 
implement the recommendations made before America is the victim of a 
paralyzing IED terror campaign.    
D. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
As DoD and JIEDDO continue to develop C-IED capabilities for the 
military in Iraq and Afghanistan and for future conflicts, so too must the 
government develop countermeasures for a domestic IED threat.  This thesis will 
propose how to prevent a domestic IED terror campaign by utilizing the 
intelligence triggers indications and warnings, and open source intelligence as 
well as placing increased emphasis on the importance of international and 
interagency cooperation.  The benefits of this thesis could be the development of 
a methodology for intelligence sharing between federal agencies, state 
authorities, and local U.S. law enforcement personnel against an aspect of 
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE IED TERROR THREAT 
In order to combat a threat there must first be a thorough understanding of 
the threat.  In the case of IEDs, it is not only important to understand current 
tactics, techniques, and procedures of the devices employment, it is important to 
understand the history and significant aspects of the threat.  This chapter 
provides the background necessary to help understand the IED threat facing the 
United States. 
A. DEFINING THE THREAT 
As defined by DoD in the introductory chapter, an IED is “a device placed 
or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, 
pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, 
harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from 
nonmilitary components.”13  If the definition is not vague enough, to further 
complicate matters there are three general categories of IEDs.  The first category 
is package IEDs.  Roadside bombs and IEDs placed inside backpacks for use on 
a bus such as the case in the 2004 Madrid train and 2005 London subway / bus 
bombings are examples of package IEDs.  The second category is Vehicle Borne 
IEDs.  This second category is essentially a car or truck bomb, however, when 
an individual is in the vehicle when the IED is detonated the IED is considered a 
suicide VBIED.  The third and final category is Suicide Bomb IEDs.14  This 
category of IEDs encompasses the use of IEDs through suicide vests, 
backpacks, or any instance when the IED is placed on or very near the suicide 
attacker.   
 
                                            
13  Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Term, 252. 
14  “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) / Booby Traps,” GlobalSecurity.org, January 11, 
2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied.htm (accessed October 15, 2007). 
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While this thesis is primarily concerned with package type Improvised Explosive 
Devices and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices, the reader must also 
be cognizant of the suicide bomb IED which could potentially be  
used as it has been in Israel and Britain. 
The potential IED threat in America is vastly different from the IED threat 
posed to service members in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In Iraq and Afghanistan for 
example, IEDs are used as a counter mobility weapon and attrition weapon.  
IEDs are also used for elaborate propaganda, fund raising, recruiting and to 
undermine the morale of opposing forces.  In America, however, the primary 
reason for terrorists to utilize IEDs would be to create terror.  This is not to say a 
successful attack would not help with recruitment or lower the morale of U.S. 
citizens because it would; but the reasoning for using IEDs in America is 
fundamentally different from why IEDs are used in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
B. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 
To fully comprehend the IED threat posed to the United States homeland 
one must first understand the threat as it has existed throughout history and most 
importantly today in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The reason IEDs must be understood 
as they exist in Iraq and Afghanistan today is because Islamic extremists pose 
the greatest threat to America.  While organizations such as the IRA use 
VBIEDs, the likelihood of the IRA or another organization attacking the United 
States using IRA TTPs is unlikely.  After examining the fundamentals of IED 
usage in Iraq and Afghanistan, the similarities and differences of who, what, 
when, and why can be evaluated in comparison to the United States.   
Before discussing the main differences of an IED threat in America and 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the similarity between the three should be identified.  The 
similarity would be the target of the attack, because in both circumstances the 
target is usually iconic / symbolic.  In Iraq and Afghanistan the iconic targets tend 
to be military or religious in nature, individuals and their mosques of a certain 
sect, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) personnel or operating bases, buildings 
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developed with U.S. direction or assistance, government buildings, areas of 
commerce, etc.  A terror campaign in America would likely target commercial, 
religious, or other iconic targets.  Likely targets in America include government 
buildings, malls, professional sporting events, financial institutions, and of course 
large numbers of American civilians.  The logic behind iconic targets is not too 
difficult to understand.  Attacks against such targets would be highly publicized, 
rewarding the terrorists with “the biggest bang for the buck” so to speak. 
Now that some of the similarities have been highlighted, it is beneficial to 
highlight some of the differences.  The most important of all considerations is 
determining at what level of capacity the perpetrators will most likely be able to 
operate.  In this respect, the operating tactics terrorists would likely employ in 
America would vary significantly from the standard operating procedures 
insurgents use in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, most individuals 
involved with IED operations are linked by a complex tribal or family affiliation or 
something of the sort, as part of a larger IED network. Furthermore, there are 
thousands of willing participants, both Iraqi and foreign, to assist in terrorist 
activities in the war in Iraq.  With the overwhelming number of volunteers it is no 
surprise that there is popular support in Iraq for IED operations and as a result 
the ease and simplicity of which terrorists can perform IED attacks plays in their 
favor.  Despite the large number of willing and capable terrorists to perform these 
attacks, the IED cells usually consist of only a five to ten man team.  The size of 
the basic IED element is the only similarity the U.S. would likely see if an IED 
attack occurs.  In America there will be no vast popular support network for an 
IED terror campaign, and there definitely are not thousands of volunteers ready 
to perform such attacks.  However, there are some disgruntled individuals in this 
country who could perform IED attacks.  How these individuals find each other 
would differ greatly from Iraq and Afghanistan.  The chances of their being a 
large family or tribal involvement between the perpetrators of a terror campaign 
in America is unlikely.  Odds are the individuals involved will find each other in a 
social network manner or will be recruited in prisons.      
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The largest single reason America might be able to prevent an IED terror 
campaign is the fact that terrorists often broadcast their intentions.  In Iraq and 
Afghanistan, IEDs occur every day executed by many different groups of 
individuals on a wide array of targets.  With IED attacks an every day occurrence 
committed by such a large number of actors, the perpetrators do not need to 
broadcast intentions of attack sites and personnel in Iraq.  In contrast, Al Qaeda 
and other radical Islamist terrorist organizations engage in extensive propaganda 
and may telegraph their intentions for supporters and financiers. 
Another large difference would be the type of IED constructed and used in 
America compared to Iraq and Afghanistan.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, IEDs are 
commonly built out of discarded military ordnance and a small percentage are 
expertly constructed devices such as an Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) in 
order to penetrate armored vehicles.  Obviously, terrorists in the United States 
would have a more difficult time getting access to military ordnance, also there is 
no need for them to have an IED capable of penetrating up armored vehicles.  
When the goal of an IED attack is a terror campaign and not destructing 
American military vehicles, simple household chemicals and materials are more 
than adequate to accomplish the task.  To create an IED for use in America, a 
terrorist would only need items available at a Home Depot store.   
1. Asymmetric Threat  
Terrorist organizations by their very nature are left with no viable option 
but to use asymmetric weapons and tactics in their operations.  Terrorists do not 
have the capabilities to terrorize U.S. citizens using conventional weapons of war 
such as tanks, aircraft, and howitzers.  As a result if terrorists wish to impose fear 
on America or any enemy who is technologically superior they are forced to use 
asymmetric weapons and tactics.   
The benefit of using an asymmetric threat to terrorize a society is the 
widespread fear generated which encompasses more than the victims of the 
attack.  The goal of the 4th generation warfare tactic is to undermine the 
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legitimacy of the government being targeted through terrorizing its citizens.  The 
Bush administration has been under pressure to reduce troop strength in Iraq 
and Afghanistan due to the perception that little progress has been made in the 
region and the conflict continues to be drawn out.  Coupled with the fact that 
IEDs are the largest killer of service members overseas, an IED terror campaign 
in America would certainly play into the 4th generation tactic and possibly 
increase pressure against the current administration.   
2. Economical and Effective 
One reason IEDs are an ideal weapon for terrorists to execute a terror 
campaign is that they are extremely cost effective and yet can achieve 
devastating casualties and instill widespread fear.  IEDs can be constructed out 
of any number of household items so the economic benefit alone for using these 
devices might be reason enough for a terrorist to pursue an IED terror strategy. 
When one combines the low costs of building an IED with the effectiveness of the 
devices, their appeal is obvious.   
With regard to the IED’s effectiveness, one should look at it two ways.  
First is the ability of the devices to cause fatalities and destruction.  Take for 
example the 1995 Murrah Federal building bombing in Oklahoma City by Timothy 
McVeigh.  A second reason an IED can be effective is because of the 
widespread terror it imposes on a society.  Knowing an attack can occur 
anywhere at anytime is enough to paralyze a society with fear.  Those who doubt 
this need only to look back at the random yet persistent threat the D.C. snipers 
imposed on D.C. and surrounding areas.  John Muhammed and Lee Malvo in 
2005 killed only ten individuals with a rifle in three weeks yet managed to cause 
such a state of fear that parents were keeping their children home from school 




3. The Psychological and Propaganda Effects of IEDs 
IEDs can be an effective weapon in a terror campaign in the United 
States.  IEDs can have a devastating psychological impact especially when used 
in conjunction with propaganda or even a crude IO campaign.   
“While IEDs typically do not inflict mass casualties, they create an 
atmosphere of insecurity, fear and demoralization in the region they are 
employed.”15  This fear is magnified more in a country where the population live 
their lives relatively free of fear, such as the United States, as opposed to a 
country where the population live in a constant state of fear, such as Israel.  
Obviously a suicide bomber attack at a mall in Chicago will have a greater 
psychological impact on the citizens of Illinois and the United States than a 
suicide bomber attack on Israelis in a market place in Israel. 
Another reason there would be a greater psychological impact on 
Americans would be due to media coverage.  Not only have terrorists become 
extremely effective with the use of propaganda both before and after an attack, 
the 24 hour American media coverage would flood the airwaves with raw, 
detailed footage entering the living rooms of households across the country.  The 
impact of the 2005 sniper attacks in D.C. and surrounding areas by John 
Muhammed and Lee Malvo should again be used as a guide.  The media 
gravitated toward the sniper attacks not because of the number of resulting 
fatalities but because they were asymmetric, random, and could happen to 
anybody.  As a result the attacks were broadcast around the country.   
If an IED terror campaign was executed in a manner similar to that of the 
Washington D.C. snipers, and possibly on a broader scale, those responsible 
would likely have video of the pre-attack effort posted on the Internet before any 
kind of governmental response to the attack was possible.   
                                            
15  Lepore, 9. 
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The extensive media coverage would report the attack and its results in a 
manner that would benefit the attackers of the terror campaign.16   
4. Recruitment 
For the United States to be successful in preventing an IED terror 
campaign, our government and law enforcement officials must have a thorough 
understanding of why and how an individual can be driven to perform terrorist 
acts and where these terrorists are being recruited.  The former Director for 
Britain’s Security Service (MI-5) responsible for protecting the United Kingdom 
against threats to national security assessed what motivates Islamic extremists.  
Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, assessed that Islamic extremists are “motivated 
by a sense of grievance and injustice driven by their interpretation of the history 
between the West and the Muslim world.”17  Current U.S. policy in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Israel is viewed by many Muslims as anti-Muslim and has aided 
terrorists in their recruitment efforts.  
Under the assumption that extremists are driven by the injustice between 
the West and the Muslim world, Manningham-Buller explains that “more and 
more people are moving from passive sympathy towards active terrorism through 
being radicalized or indoctrinated by friends, families, in organized training 
events here (England) and overseas, by images on television, through chat 
rooms and websites on the Internet.”18 
In addition to the methods of radicalization or indoctrination mentioned by 
Manningham-Buller, Michael Waller testified before the subcommittee on 
terrorism, technology, and homeland security, “on terrorist penetration of the U.S. 
military and prison systems via corruption of the chaplain programs, and how it 
fits in with a larger foreign-sponsored campaign to build terrorist support 
                                            
16 The chapter title and subtitles of this chapter mirror Chapter II of Lepore’s master’s thesis. 
17  Eliza Manningham-Buller, “The International Terrorist Threat to the UK,” (London, 
England: MI5, 2006) http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page374.html (accessed October 16, 2007). 
18 Ibid. 
 16
networks inside this country.”19  Amazingly Waller discovered “foreign states and 
movements have been financing Islamism within America’s armed forces and 
prisons which preaches intolerance and hatred of American society, culture, 
government, and the principles enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and whose 
adherents directly and indirectly spawn, train, finance, supply and mobilize 
terrorists who would destroy our system of government and our way of life.”20  
Perhaps the issue is not where extremists are recruiting because the answer 
appears to be everywhere, but what is the best way to counter recruitment 
propaganda.    
C. AN ENDURING THREAT 
The use of IEDs has been a significant and very real threat worldwide for 
several decades.  The IRA use of IEDs in Northern Ireland has been well 
documented since the 1970’s; by the Red Army at Ramstein Air Force base in 
1981; the U.S. embassy in Beirut by Islamic Jihadists in 1983; and recently in 
London in 2005 to name a few.  Although IEDs have been used as a terrorist 
weapon in recent decades, to date IEDs have not posed a significant threat to 
the United States.  However, since the first American casualty from an IED attack 
in Iraq in mid-2003, terrorists and future adversaries of the United States have 
been taking particular notice of the device.  Our future adversaries have been 
investigating how IEDs could be a beneficial weapon against the U.S. military.  
Even more troubling is the fact they have been exploring using these devices for 
use against civilian populations, as evidenced by the recent attacks in Britain and 
Spain.   
With the successful use of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan against both military and 
civilian targets, and with the U.S. military’s difficulty countering the insurgents’ 
                                            
19  Michael J. Waller, “Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in the United States: Prisons and 
Military as an Operational Base,” (Washington D.C.: United States Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 2003), http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2003_h/031014-
waller.htm (accessed October 16, 2007). 
20  Ibid. 
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IED tactics, techniques and procedures, the United States should expect to 
encounter the use of IEDs in America primarily as a weapon for a terror 
campaign.   
D. WHY IT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICA 
The most compelling reason IEDs will be used in America is because 
America is leading the effort in the global war on terror, and as a result has 
become a symbolic target.  Additionally it will happen because of all the reasons 
discussed in the thesis up to this point:  IEDs are cheap, easily built out of 
household goods, and effective in the sense of destructive capabilities and 
psychological impacts on the intended targets.  Additional reasons IEDs will be 
used in America can be found by looking at how they have been used earlier.  It 
is beneficial to highlight how and when IEDs have been used in America in the 
past and who has publicly stated their intentions of using IEDs or performing a 
terror campaign in the United States. 
1. Historical Examples 
There have been literally hundreds of recent IED attacks in the United 
States.  IEDs have been most commonly used by members of several 
organizations such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Earth Liberation Front 
(ELF) and members of various anti abortionist movements, for example the Army 
of God.   
While these organizations claim responsibility for the majority of these 
types of attacks, the most devastating and well known IED attacks have come 
from the “Liberation Army Fifth Battalion” and Timothy McVeigh’s attack in 1995.  
The threat America must prepare to prevent today and in the future comes 
primarily from Islamic extremists.  The Liberation Army Fifth Battalion was 
responsible for the first attempt to bring down one of the World Trade Center 
towers on February 26, 1993.  Timothy McVeigh is responsible for parking a 
truck bomb outside of the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal building and claiming 
 18
168 lives.  The following is an example of some of the IED attacks which have 
occurred on American soil since the McVeigh attack in 1995. 
 
   
 Animal Liberation Front (ALF) attacked Business target (Mar. 12, 2000, United States)  
 Animal Liberation Front (ALF) attacked Business target (Mar. 27, 1999, United States)  
 Army of God attacked Abortion Related target (Jan. 29, 1998, United States)  
 Earth Liberation Front (ELF) attacked Business target (Dec. 25, 1999, United States)  
 
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) attacked Educational Institutions target (May 21, 2001, United 
States)  
 Earth Liberation Front (ELF) attacked Other target (May 21, 2001, United States)  
 
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) attacked Private Citizens & Property target (Dec. 19, 2000, United 
States)  
 
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) attacked Private Citizens & Property target (Dec. 29, 2000, United 
States)  
 
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) attacked Private Citizens & Property target (Dec. 9, 2000, United 
States)  
 Other Group attacked Abortion Related target (Jan. 16, 1997, United States)  
 Other Group attacked Business target (Feb. 21, 1997, United States)  
 Other Group attacked Government target (Apr. 19, 1995, United States)  
 Other Group attacked Religious Figures/Institutions target (Feb. 13, 1997, United States)  
 
Revolutionary Cells Animal Liberation Brigade attacked Business target (Sept. 26, 2003, United 
States)  
 Unknown Group attacked Abortion Related target (June 11, 2001, United States)  
 Unknown Group attacked Business target (Aug. 28, 2003, United States)  
 Unknown Group attacked Business target (Jan. 12, 2005, United States)  
 Unknown Group attacked Business target (Nov. 1, 1999, United States)  
 Unknown Group attacked Government target (Nov. 5, 2001, United States)  
 Unknown Group attacked Private Citizens & Property target (Dec. 27, 2004, United States)  
 
Figure 1.   Examples of IED attacks on American soil from the Memorial Institute 
for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Knowledge Base 
Fortunately, America has yet to experience an IED attack similar in nature 
to the subway bombings in London on July 7, 2005, perpetrated by Islamic 
Extremists in Europe.  However, IED attacks have occurred in the United States 
over the past several decades and many non-state actors posses the intentions 
to attack and terrorize America; therefore the realization of the threat is becoming 




Since well before September 11, 2001, America has known the U.S. is a 
target for terrorist organizations.  The fact that America is concerned about future 
attacks is evident by improvements made in aviation security, maritime security, 
and critical infrastructure protection.  Intentions to attack America are being 
initiated by Osama Bin Laden and attacks can be carried out by Al Qaeda, Al 
Qaeda splinter organizations, or any other extremist terrorist organization. 
An indication that the current administration is concerned that terrorist 
organizations may use IEDs, is the new Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 19 which “establishes a national policy, and calls for the development of 
a national strategy and implementation plan, on the prevention and detection of, 
protection against, and response to terrorist use of explosives in the 
United States.”21  In February, 2007 when the Presidential directive was issued, 
the White House was conducting a rehearsal for a domestic IED attack.   
Not all of the American public recognizes the intentions held by terrorist 
organizations to perform an IED terror campaign; however, our Government 
acknowledges the threat and the initial phases of understanding the threat and 
evaluating our countermeasures are occurring.   
                                            
21 Whitehouse, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-19,” Washington, D.C.: 
2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/hspd19/ (accessed August 21, 2007). 
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III. IED TERROR THREAT AND RESPONSE IN FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES 
One way to better understand the threat suicide bombings and other forms 
of IEDs pose to America is to study how they were employed in foreign countries.  
Such understanding is paramount if America is going to be successful in 
preventing an IED terror campaign against the homeland.  Britain, Spain, and 
Israel all have experience with combating an IED threat posed by Islamic 
extremists and much can be learned from their experiences.  Although there are 
dozens of countries that must contend with an IED threat, Britain, Spain, and 
Israel were selected for case studies because of their similarities to American 
society.  Any major U.S. city could be the scene of the next London, Madrid, or 
Tel Aviv type attack. 
A. BRITAIN 
Britain has several decades of experience combating the IED threat posed 
by the IRA, and as of July 2005, the British have experience combating the IED 
threat posed by Islamic extremists.  A summary of the July 7, 2005, London 
bombings will serve as an example of the threat posed to Britain.  Portions of the 
subsequent July 21, 2005, attempted attack will also be discussed to assist in 
fully understanding the threat as part of a campaign.   
1. Background of Perpetrators 
The background of the terrorists responsible for the London attacks should 
be of particular importance to American authorities.  All of the terrorists involved 
were “homegrown”, but did have ties to Pakistan.  Three of the four suicide 
bombers involved were British nationals of Pakistani origin and the fourth bomber 
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was British of west-Indian origins.22  None of the terrorists had criminal records 
and three of the four did not register on any intelligence watch lists.23  All lived 
middle class lives and were radicalized through an Islamic youth center.24  One 
of the terrorists, Mohammad Siddeque Khan, explained his reasoning for the 
attack in a farewell video message.  “Until you will stop the bombing, gassing, 
imprisonment and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight.”25 
2. Target Selection and Method of Attack  
The target selection and method of attack should also be of great concern 
to American authorities as both could be easily duplicated in America.  The 
targets chosen were “because of national and global symbolism”, and were 
committed during rush hour.26  The attacks occurred in the subway system and 
on a bus to affect the transportation system as a whole.  These targets were 
selected because they are easy to attack and because they are heavily used.  
The terrorists used backpacks filled with 2kg to 5kg of peroxide-based 
explosives, a substance easily made at home.27 
3. Part of a Campaign?   
The unsuccessful attempted attack on July 21 was essentially the same 
as the attack on July 7, including the composition of the IED, which has left 
British authorities attempting to determine if the follow on attack was part of a 
campaign or if it was a copycat.  Regardless of whether it is determined the 
                                            
22  Frank Gregory, “The London Bomb Incidents of 7 and 21 July 2005: ‘New Normality’ or 
just as Predicted?” February 6, 2006, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/245.asp 
(accessed October 21, 2007). 
23  Thomas Mockaitis, "London Bombings," (PowerPoint presentation at DePaul University, 
2005). CAPT Timothy Doorey e-mailed presentation to author, October 10, 2007. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. 




attacks were part of a campaign or a copycat; there are lessons to be learned 
from the British authorities.  While the British were not successful in preventing 
the attacks, they were rather successful with their response to the attacks.  
Lessons learned from the British response could potentially assist America in the 
prevention of an attack so it is important to understand the British response. 
4. Response   
Needless to say the British controlled the area, and shut down the 
transportation system initially.  There was excellent emergency response and 
information control.  While those are natural responses to an emergency, the 
reason Britain was successful in their response can be divided into four 
categories.  Those categories are experience, preparedness, practice, and 
informed citizens.  As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, British 
authorities have been combating the use of IEDs by the IRA both in England and 
Northern Ireland for several decades and are well rehearsed in detection, 
response, and recovery.  Through their experience combating IEDs, British 
authorities have devised sound planning over the years including a crises 
management apparatus and a clear delineation of responsibility.  Exercises are 
often performed by authorities to rehearse responsibilities and to gauge the 
effectiveness of systems in place.  Finally but certainly not least, the British have 
informed citizens.  The security consciousness of British citizens can also be 
attributed to the IRA IED threat but also because of efforts by MI5, the British 
Transportation Police, and other such organizations to keep citizens informed.28 
The MI5 director during the 2005 bombings gave a solemn speech in 2006 
articulating procedures taken since 9/11 that have contributed to Britain’s 
success in preventing terrorists attacks with the exception of the July bombings.  
Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former MI5 director explained she increased 
her staff to almost 3000 personnel in an attempt to keep up with the daunting 
                                            
28  Gregory, “The London Bomb Incidents of 7 and 21 July 2005: ‘New Normality’ or just as 
Predicted?”  
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amount of work required to prevent terrorist attacks.  In regard to new procedures 
and tactics, “often to protect public safety the police need to disrupt plots on the 
basis of intelligence but before evidence sufficient to bring criminal charges has 
been collected.”29  In response to the increased threat facing the nation, MI5 is 
faced with the need to prioritize threats.  This prioritization which changes every 
day includes, “whom to follow, whose telephone lines need listening to, which 
seized media needs to go to the top of the analytic pile.”30  With the increased 
staff, new tactics, techniques, and procedures, Manningham-Buller claims the 
MI5 was tracking near 30 plots to attack the United Kingdom during 2006.31 
Jonathan Edwards replaced Manningham-Buller as the MI5 director in 
April 2007 and recently stated the terrorist threat to the UK is on the rise.  A 
recent address by Edwards emphasized the rise in terrorist recruitment of young 
children, the fact that the attacks on London were part of a “deliberate 
campaign”, and the importance of tackling the “root causes” of the growing 
extremism.32  “There are at least 2000 people in the UK who pose a threat to 
national security because of their support for terrorism…a rise of 400 since 
November 2006.”33  Edwards did not specify how the UK will attempt to minimize 
terrorist recruitment efforts nor the “root causes” of extremism, but acknowledged 
these phenomena pose a larger threat to the UK now then they have in the past.   
5. Lessons Learned 
There are many aspects of the 2005 London bombing which can assist 
America in preventing an IED terror campaign.  Those aspects include detecting 
the radicalization effort of young men (and women) in the homeland; 
                                            
29 Manningham-Buller, “The International Terrorist Threat to the UK.” 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 "'Thousands' Pose UK Terror Threat," BBC News, November 5, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7078712.stm (accessed November 15, 2007). 
33 Ibid. 
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understanding the demographics of potential terrorists; identifying potential 
symbolic, iconic, or likely targets; the use of peroxide-based explosives, and 
method of delivery.  America does not have over 30 years of experience 
combating IEDs per se, but American authorities can still learn from Britain’s 
experience with the IRA and current tactics, techniques, and procedures.  
Additionally the U.S. can learn from Britain the need to increase planning for IED 
attacks, perform more rehearsals, and increase public awareness of the IED 
threat to America.    
B. SPAIN 
The March 11, 2004 bombings and the events of March 12, April 2, and 
April 3 in Madrid, Spain share several characteristics with the July 2005 London 
bombings; however, there are several aspects of the Madrid bombing that are 
different from the London bombing and should be recognized.  In a manner 
similar to the Britain case study, the Spain case study will provide insight into the 
background and recruitment of the bombers, target selection and method of 
attack, the Spanish response, and what the United States can learn from the 
attack. 
1. Background of Perpetrators 
One of the greatest differences between the London bombings and Madrid 
bombings is the background of the terrorists.  The key perpetrators were 
criminals, specifically drug traffickers, who had origins in a Moroccan Islamic 
combatant group.  Many of them were radicalized or began planning the 
operation while in the Spanish prison system.34  With criminal backgrounds the 
terrorists provided expertise in fund raising, explosive procurement, covert 
                                            
34 "Madrid Bombing Accused 'Under Watch since 2002'." Expatica, March 7, 2007, 
http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=82&story_id=37231 (accessed 
October 23, 2007). 
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activities and criminal contacts.35 As a result of the terrorist’s criminal past, 
Spanish law enforcement did have intelligence on several of the perpetrators.36 
2. Target Selection and Method of Attack   
Like the London bombings, the March 11 Madrid bombings focused on the 
transportation system during peak hours.  There were four separate attacks with 
each attack being comprised of one to four backpacks filled with nitro glycerin 
based explosives.37  The attacks occurred during morning rush hour between 
7:39AM and 7:54AM and killed 191 people.  The advanced composition of the 
IEDs required the explosives to be acquired as opposed to making them at home 
using household chemicals.   
3. Part of a Campaign?   
The primary IED attack was on March 11, 2004; however, this attack was 
likely part of a larger terror campaign with follow on attacks attempted on March 
12 and April 2.  On March 12 and April 2, bombs were found on the railway 
system and diffused, assisting authorities in forensic collection and analysis.  On 
April 3, Spanish authorities surrounded the apartment building of the suspected 
terrorists but the terrorists committed suicide by detonating several explosives.  
The failed attacks can be confirmed as part of a larger terror campaign because 
the DNA of one of the terrorists, Asir Rifat Anouar, from the apartment building 
explosion was found on the bag concealing the IED of the attempted April 2 
attack.38 
                                            
35 Phil Williams, “Terrorist Finances: From Funding Networks to Self-Financing Terror,” 
(PowerPoint presentation at the University of Pittsburgh, June 2007). CAPT Timothy Doorey e-
mailed presentation to author, October 10, 2007. 
36 “Madrid Bombing Accused 'Under Watch since 2002'.” 




The immediate Spanish responses to the Madrid bombing were similar to 
the British.  The transportation system was shut down, the areas were cordoned 
off, and law enforcement and emergency services were on scene.  However, this 
is where the similarities between the British response and the Spanish response 
end.  Initially the Spanish government accused ETA with the March 11 attacks 
because they have been combating ETA since 1959 and IEDs are a common 
weapon of the terrorist organization.  Additionally, the Spanish general elections 
were to be held on March 14 and ETA had threatened to conduct a bombing 
campaign before the election.  Despite placing the initial blame on ETA, the 
Partido Popular lost the election and the newly elected Partido Socialista Obrero 
Espanol’s response to the Madrid bombings was a rapid withdraw of troops in 
Iraq.  In addition to the troop withdraws in Iraq, the only other response of the 
Spanish government was to increase investigation on potential threats.  There is 
not as much to learn from the government response in the Madrid attack as there 
is to the London attack, however, there is much to learn from different aspects of 
the attack. 
5. Lessons Learned   
There are several important aspects of the Madrid bombing that could 
potentially assist in preventing an IED terror campaign in the United States.  
First, not all terrorists are “homegrown”.  While Morocco is close to Spain, the 
perpetrators were not Spanish, although they had lived in Spain for many years.  
Terrorists and potential terrorists are not limited to certain demographics and can 
come from anywhere.  Second is the realization that criminals can also be 
radicalized and turned into terrorists capable of performing unspeakable acts.  
Often, criminals are a greater threat than extremists.  Radicalized criminals are 
not only motivated but they bring with them money, expertise in covert activities, 
and contacts.  It is this criminal radicalization factor that made the Madrid 
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bombings more effective than the London bombings.  Criminal activities can be 
an indication of potential terrorist activities.  The third aspect is the importance of 
cooperation between intelligence agencies and law enforcement.  Since criminal 
activities can be an indication of potential terrorist activities it is critical that 
intelligence agencies and law enforcement cooperate and especially with 
intelligence sharing.  If these different organizations fail to communicate 
effectively with each other valuable intelligence will be missed and the chances 
of disrupting terrorist attacks decrease.  Fourth and finally, this attack 
demonstrated the evolution of terrorist financing from fund raising, transfer, and 
spending (FRTS) to fund raising, and spending (FRS) also known as self-
financing.  This implies self financing is sufficient in conducting large scale terror 
campaigns and outside donations are not necessary.39   
C. ISRAEL 
Due to the multitude of factors and complexity of the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, this case study will examine the IED threat in Israel in the broadest 
sense and extract only information that can assist the United States in 
developing preventive measures.  The most important aspect of the Israel case 
study is that unlike Britain and Spain, IED attacks, specifically suicide IED 
attacks, occur often in Israel due to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  IEDs 
are used as both a weapon of attrition in Israel, and as an instrument in a terror 
campaign, since there is a considerable psychological impact on Israeli citizens.  
Israel, has nearly fifteen years of experience responding to the IED threat inside 
their borders, the occupied territories and in Lebanon and has developed 
countermeasures that could assist the U.S. in developing preventive measures.   
1. Background of Terrorists 
The IED attacks that occur within Israel are executed by a multitude of 
organizations including Hamas, Hezbollah, the military portion of Fatah, and the 
                                            
39 Williams, “Terrorist Finances: From Funding Networks to Self-Financing Terror.” 
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Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).40  The motivation for the 
IED attacks can be attributed to the Israeli-Palestinian territorial issue which has 
since turned into a religious conflict.41  A simple Google search of “suicide 
bombers and Israel” will return dozens of hits detailing the willingness of young 
Palestinians to “martyr” themselves in Israel if they believe God wills it.    
2. Target Selection and Method of Attack 
The majority of attacks are executed on civilians at locations and times 
that will result in the greatest number of casualties.  The suicide IED is most 
commonly used and the method of attack has been extremely effective causing 
more than 739 deaths as of 2006.42  The composition of the IEDs being used 
varies.  The most likely cause for the variety of IEDs is the multitude of 
organizations and actors involved in executing the attacks.   
3. Part of a Campaign? 
The use of suicide IEDs in Israel is part of a campaign.  “The vast majority 
of suicide bombings (98%) are part of an organized campaign.”43  The campaign 
against Israel is a terror campaign; the same type of campaign America is aiming 
to prevent.   
4. Response 
The core of Israel’s unclassified response to the IED threat is comprised of 
one detrimental and two beneficial measures.  Examining the detrimental 
responses to a threat is as important as examining the beneficial or effective 
                                            
40  Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2004), 119. 
41 Ibid., 100. 
42  Philip E. Kapusta, “Suicide Bombers in CONUS,” AMSP Monograph, U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2007, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA470697 (accessed 
October 25, 2007). 
43 Ibid., iii. 
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responses to a threat because often times more can be learned from failure than 
success.  When discussing the IED threat response in Israel, the massive 
numbers of attacks each year and the geopolitical climate must not be forgotten.   
a. Detrimental Response 
Since the IED threat is a cross border threat between the occupied 
territories and Israel proper, Israel’s primary response to the threat has been 
increasing border security.  This measure includes the building of a security 
fence which essentially “demarcate(s) nearly the entire border between Israel 
and the purported Palestinian state.”44  The logic behind building a security fence 
is rational; however, the effects of such an action are detrimental and will be 
discussed in the lessons learned portion of the case study.  
b. Beneficial Response 
Another response taken and arguably a more constructive 
response in the long run was to regulate the precursors of homemade 
explosives.  Because of the common use of acetone in the explosives used 
against Israel, acetone was closely monitored and was made essentially 
impossible to acquire.45  Limiting the availability of such key precursor chemicals 
to a terrorist can disrupt the planning cycle and reduce the frequency of attack. 
A second beneficial response of the Israeli’s was infiltrating the 
terrorist organizations responsible for suicide attacks in Israel.46  This response 
allows for the early detection of future attacks with the added benefit of learning 
who the responsible terrorists are; how they are operating; where they are 
planning and operating; where they are receiving funding and resources; etc. 
                                            
44 James S. Robbins, "When Bad Neighbors Require Good Fences," National Review 
Online, August 1, 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/robbins/robbins080103.asp (accessed 
October 25, 2007). 
45 Roger Davies, phone interview by author, October 20, 2007. 
46 Ibid. 
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5. Lessons Learned 
Although only two responses made by Israel are mentioned, they are both 
extremely important and both can help the U.S. prevent an IED threat.  There is 
nothing wrong with increasing border security; however, there are issues with 
erecting a wall that builds boundaries and establishes territory.  By building the 
security wall Israel is further alienating certain communities.  The issue is not the 
security wall itself; the issue is the alienation of certain communities created by 
the wall.  Alienating or segregating certain communities or sects can be 
detrimental to building the relations required to defeat or overcome the issue at 
hand.  Islamic extremists pose the largest IED threat to America, but that does 
not mean that alienating the Muslim community in the United States would help 
reduce the threat.  The opposite is true.   
The measure of clamping down on homemade explosive precursors is 
vital.  In the United States, as in Israel, the government has recognized the 
importance of such actions, and has recently published literature on the 
indications of homemade explosive precursor production.  The U.S. government 
has learned from the Oklahoma City bombing and is familiar with the use of 
common chemical precursors in the production of explosives in foreign countries, 
but that knowledge alone is not enough.  America must develop effective 
measures to clamp down and monitor the sale of those common chemical 
precursors.  According to a joint homeland security assessment by DHS and the 
FBI, terrorist interest is growing in peroxide-based explosives.47   
                                            
47 Office of Intelligence and Analysis Homeland Security, “Peroxide-Based Explosives: 
Terrorist Interest Growing,” (Washington D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007). 
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IV. EVOLUTION OF U.S. COUNTER-IED EFFORTS 
U.S. C-IED efforts began in response to the increase of IED attacks and 
coalition fatalities in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.  To date, U.S. 
C-IED efforts continue to be directed at combating IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
however, as terrorists broaden their target selection standards, so too should the 
U.S. broaden its C-IED efforts.  The U.S. has made some progress in identifying 
and responding to enemy IED activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, but little has 
been done to develop C-IED efforts for use within the United States.  The vast 
majority of military C-IED technological efforts are not applicable for domestic 
use; however, the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) retains knowledge 
and expertise that can assist in preventing a domestic IED terror campaign.   
A quick background of military C-IED efforts and practices should provide 
the foundation necessary to understand where certain aspects of domestic C-IED 
measures should be focused.   
A. MILITARY COUNTER-IED EFFORTS 
The following table lists the most significant events leading to current U.S. 
military C-IED efforts: 
DATE EVENT 
Mar 03 Initial invasion of Iraq 
Jul 03 First recorded U.S. death from IED in OIF 
Oct 03 Army IED Task Force created 
Apr 04 Army proposed the activation of an Asymmetric Warfare Regiment to 
oversee IED response and counter-terrorism profiles (later designated 
Asymmetric Warfare Group AWG) 
Jun 04 Gen Abizaid calls for a “Manhattan Project” for countering IEDs 
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Jul 04 Pentagon renames and expands Army IED TF to Joint IED Defeat IPT 
Jul 05 Pentagon renames and expands JIEDD IPT to JIEDD Task Force 
Dec 05 GEN Meigs (Ret.) replaces BG Votel as head of the JIEDD TF 
Jan 06 DSD England makes the JIEDD TF permanent renaming it JIEDD 
Organization, and gives it training and equipping authority 
 
Figure 2.   Counter IED Time Line. 48 
JIEDDO’s approach to the IED threat in Iraq and Afghanistan is a three 
pronged effort.  In no particular order, the efforts consist of defeating the device, 
attacking the network, and training the force.  Currently JIEDDO is allocating over 
60% of their efforts to defeating the device, and only 30% to attacking the 
network.49  Many individuals believe a stronger emphasis should have been 
placed on attacking the network due to the ingenuity of our adversaries, and over 
the past few years JIEDDO has come to the same realization.  In fiscal year 
2006, only 13% of JIEDDO’s efforts were concentrated on attacking the network 
while almost 80% was dedicated to defeating the device.50  The trend is moving 
in the right direction and eventually an appropriate balance will be found.  The 
reason emphasis has been placed on defeating the network is because it is 
easier to defeat the threat if it is not in motion.  By concentrating primarily on the 
defeating the device, the network has the ability to attack when and where it 
wants to.  Logically speaking, if there is no IED network, there is no IED threat. 
“Training the force” is an important aspect in neutralizing the threat in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, but it provides little insight on how to prevent the threat in the 
homeland, unless the training assists Federal, State, and local authorities identify 
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the signals of a pending IED campaign.  “Defeating the device” is also of minimal 
value primarily because the effort establishes that the device is being used and 
does nothing to prevent the IED threat from becoming a threat in the first place.  
“Attacking the network”, however, is extremely valuable in formulating measures 
to prevent an IED threat in America.  Perhaps with the increased effort and some 
of the newfound methods used by JIEDDO to attack the network in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, our security personnel will become better prepared to prevent an 
IED threat in America.  This includes monitoring Islamist terrorist propaganda 
and Internet chat rooms for indications and warning of a pending IED terror 
campaign. 
B. DOMESTIC COUNTER-IED EFFORTS 
The United States is in the beginning phase of learning how to deal with 
the IED threat.  Since the U.S. is in the initial phase of C-IED effort 
implementation and because this thesis is unclassified, discussing the details of 
domestic C-IED measures is not possible.  However, it is possible to examine 
what has been stated publicly about domestic C-IED efforts and this section will 
do so.  There has been a presidential directive issued addressing the issue and a 
symposium held by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff warning 
America of the threat and what is being done about it.  Specifically this section 
will examine the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19 and comments 
made by Michael Chertoff in an October, 2007 address about the domestic IED 
threat facing America. 
While there has not been significant progress in developing C-IED 
measures within the United States, the Bush administration, experts in homeland 
security, and many other individuals have acknowledged the possibility of an IED 
threat in America.  To be better prepared for an IED threat in America, the White 
House ran an exercise in February 2007 “to test responses to the prospect of a 
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massive domestic terrorist attack involving IEDs.”51  The rehearsal occurred only 
two weeks after HSPD-19 was issued but months before the deadlines set forth 
in the directive are to be met.  The results of the exercise have not been released 
to the public.   
1. HSPD - 19 
There are many critics of HSPD-19 and much of what is being said is true.  
The directive lacks strategic guidance and has not provided government 
agencies, state officials, local authorities, and the private sector with specifics on 
what it needs to do to prevent IED attacks in America.  With that said the 
directive is still important because next to a few remarks made by Chertoff, it is 
all America has.  The directive must be reviewed in order to understand future 
legislation and actions being taken by DHS to prevent the IED threat.  
The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19 was issued on February 
12, 2007, and is currently the only policy which addresses defense against 
explosives / IEDs.  The directive focuses on policy and implementation actions 
needed to support the policy.  The policy set forth in the directive states:  
It is the policy of the United States to counter the threat of explosive 
attacks aggressively by coordinating Federal, State, local, territorial, 
and tribal government efforts and collaborating with the owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure and key resources to deter, 
prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to explosive attacks, 
including the following: analysis of potential threats of explosive 
attacks; using the most effective technologies, capabilities, 
and explosives search procedures, and applications thereof, to 
detect, locate, and render safe explosives before they detonate or 
function as part of an explosive attack, including detection of 
explosive materials and precursor chemicals used to make 
improvised explosive or incendiary mixtures; applying all 
appropriate resources to pre-blast or pre-functioning search and 
explosives render-safe procedures, and to post-blast or post-
functioning investigatory and search activities, in order to 
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detect secondary and tertiary explosives and for the purposes 
of attribution; employing effective capabilities, technologies, and 
methodologies, including blast mitigation techniques, to mitigate or 
neutralize the physical effects of an explosive attack on human life, 
critical infrastructure, and key resources; clarifying specific roles 
and responsibilities of agencies and heads of agencies through all 
phases of incident management from prevention and protection 
through response and recovery.52 
The directive’s policy accurately addresses the key elements of preventing 
and responding to an IED attack / terror campaign, but more critical than the 
policy are the implementation actions.  The guidance for the implementation 
actions states: 
As soon as practicable and not later than 150 days after 
the effective date of this directive, the Attorney General, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
heads of other Sector-Specific Agencies (as defined in HSPD-7) 
and agencies that conduct explosive attack detection, prevention, 
protection, or response activities, shall submit to the President for 
approval, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism, a report, including a national 
strategy and recommendations, on how more effectively to deter, 
prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to explosive attacks, 
including the coordination of Federal Government efforts with State, 
local, territorial, and tribal governments, first responders, and 
private sector organizations.53 
Following that statement is a list of everything that shall be included in the 
report.  It is directed the report include: 
a descriptive list of all Federal statutes, regulations, policies, and 
guidance; an inventory and description of all current Federal 
Government assets and capabilities catalogued by geographic 
location, including the asset's transportability and, to the extent 
feasible, similar assets and capabilities of State, local, territorial, 
and tribal governments; an inventory and description of current 
research, development, testing, and evaluation initiatives and 
recommendations for the best means of disseminating the results 
of such initiatives to and among Federal, State, local, territorial, and 
tribal governments and first responders; an assessment of our 
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ability to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to 
an explosive attack; recommendations for improved detection of 
explosive chemical compounds, precursor chemicals; 
recommendations for developing a comprehensive understanding 
of terrorist training and construction methods relating to explosive 
attacks; recommendations for protecting critical infrastructure and 
key resources against an explosive attack; a recommended draft 
incident annex to the National Response Plan developed pursuant 
to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 of February 28, 2003 
(Management of Domestic Incidents), for explosive attacks, 
detailing specific roles and responsibilities of agencies and heads 
of agencies through all phases of incident management from 
prevention and protection through response and recovery; an 
assessment of the effectiveness of Government training and 
education initiatives relating to explosive attack detection; 
recommended components of a national public awareness and 
vigilance campaign; a recommendation on whether any additional 
Federal Government entity should be established to coordinate 
Federal Government explosive attack prevention, detection, 
protection, and response efforts and collaboration with State, local, 
territorial, and tribal government officials, first responders, and 
private sector organizations.54 
Following the approval of the report by the President, within 90 days the 
“Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland 
Security and the heads of other Sector-Specific Agencies (as defined in HSPD-7) 
and agencies that conduct explosive attack detection, prevention, protection, or 
response activities, shall develop an implementation plan.”55  Finally the 
implementation plan should “implement the policy set forth in this directive and 
any recommendations in the report that are approved by the President, and shall 
include measures to coordinate the efforts of Federal, State, local, territorial, and 
tribal government entities to develop related capabilities, allocate Federal grant 
funds effectively, coordinate training and exercise activities, and incorporate, and 
strengthen as appropriate, existing plans and procedures to communicate 
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accurate, coordinated, and timely information regarding a potential or actual 
explosive attack to the public, the media, and the private sector.”56   
As of October 2007 the report due to the President detailing the 
implementation actions has not been filed.   One can speculate the reasons why 
the deadline for the report has not been met, but it does not matter because the 
fact remains America still lacks the direction needed to confront a domestic IED 
threat.   
The foundation of America’s domestic C-IED preventive measures and 
responses not covered in HSPD-19 will be based on two factors.  The first factor 
will be learning from foreign state C-IED efforts; and the second factor will be 
learning from America’s mistakes.   
2. Chertoff’s Remarks 
On September 20, in Philadelphia “before an audience of federal agents, 
bomb squad officers, and first responders” Department of Homeland Security 
secretary Michael Chertoff attempted to raise awareness of the IED threat.57  
One month later in Washington D.C., Chertoff once again addressed the IED 
threat but also addressed how the United States is dealing with it.  The speech 
was organized into four sections.  The first section contained four points of 
emphasis, the second section addressed prevention, the third section tackled 
detection, and the fourth section covered target hardening.  Although Chertoff 
spoke of prevention separately from detection and target hardening, there should 
be an understanding that any action taken disrupting the detonation of an IED 
can be considered a preventive measure.   
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Before discussing how the U.S. will prevent, detect, and harden targets, 
Chertoff covered certain points of emphasis explaining “how we look at IEDs.”58  
As his first point of emphasis, Chertoff identifies the need to meet the threat ’left 
of the boom’.  That expression “captures and articulates this concept; that before 
we actually have the explosion, there are a series of intervention points, when if 
we can prevent something from happening, we can stop that boom from taking 
place.”59  He refers to ‘left of the boom’ on a spectrum because “it’s easy to view 
the issue of IED prevention in a very narrow focus; to look only at the issue of 
what do we do on site to prevent people from actually bringing in the bomb and 
detonating it.”60  Such emphasis was placed on the ‘left of the boom’ concept 
because “the more we can do left of boom, the less we’re going to have to do as 
we get closer to boom.”61   
The second point of emphasis was a warning that the IED threat extends 
well beyond the federal level.  He cautions all levels of the government, state 
officials, local authorities, and the private sector are participants in dealing with 
the IED threat.  Unfortunately “how we integrate the private sector with various 
levels of government in this enterprise is one of the key challenges for Homeland 
Security as we move forward.”62 
The third point of emphasis was on the importance of intelligence.  
Needless to say, accurate and timely intelligence is needed to prevent terror 
threats, but Chertoff spoke of intelligence to address the issue of civil liberties in 
a round about way.  “The more focused our intelligence gathering is, the more we 
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can respect the privacy and the way of life of the vast majority of people because 
we can be very targeted in what we do.”63 
The fourth and final point of emphasis was the importance of public 
observation.  The disruption of VBIEDs this summer in London and Glasgow, and 
the stopping of the shoe bomber Richard Reid in 2001 were used as examples to 
stress the importance of public awareness.   
The preventive measures discussed were detecting foreign terrorists, 
making it harder for domestic terrorists to get the materials (chemicals) needed to 
make an IED, information sharing, and funding through grant programs.  
Chertoff’s “optimal strategy against IEDs” is identifying foreign terrorists using 
intelligence and forensic analysis.64  He supported this preventive measure by 
identifying a terrorist who killed 124 people in Iraq with a VBIED who years 
earlier was denied access into America and fingerprinted before deportation.   
If the terrorist is not a foreign terrorist but a homegrown terrorist, Chertoff 
stated the most desirable preventive measure is increasing the difficulty of 
acquiring dangerous chemicals.  Chertoff recognizes an IED can be constructed 
using chemicals from a Home Depot and very little can be done about that, but 
“we can at least minimize some of the highest-consequence risks: dangerous 
chemicals.”65  Minimizing the highest-consequence risks can be addressed by 
“fleshing out our regulations under the chemical security laws.”66   
The third preventive measure discussed was the application of information 
sharing between the federal, state, local, and private sector.  The system in place 
to provide this preventive measure is TRIPwire, and although Chertoff spoke 
confidently about the sharing portal he neglected to mention its success to date.   
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The final preventive measure mentioned was the grant programs that 
provide funding to help increase the capacity of communities, ports, and other 
government agencies to deal with IEDs.  There were no details provided on how 
those organizations are increasing their capacity with the funding. 
The detection aspect of dealing with the IED threat relies on explosive 
detection systems, behavioral observation, and canine teams.  While these 
measures do not prevent the construction of an IED, they can be useful in 
preventing an IED from being detonated.   
The final section was target hardening and covered physical architecture 
(buffer zones), port security, including containers and boats, and “general 
aviation coming in from overseas.”67  As with many of the previous sections, 
there were no details given on what measures are being taken to harden these 
targets. 
Chertoff’s speech was unclassified, so the lack of evidence and detail is 
understandable.  However, there are several measures that could be successful 
C-IED tools that were not mentioned such as preventing the recruitment and 
radicalization of impressionable individuals in America and international 
coordination. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Using lessons learned from the British, Spanish, and Israeli case studies 
as well determining how prepared the United States is to deal with an IED threat 
based on HSPD-19 and Chertoff’s symposium, recommendations can be made 
to assist in developing domestic C-IED measures.  The following 
recommendations are made because without these measures being exercised it 
would be impossible for the United States to prevent an IED terror campaign.   
A.  INTELLIGENCE TRIGGERS 
Recommendation – The United States must increase the use of the 
intelligence triggers I&W and OSINT. 
A higher level of attention must be given to intelligence triggers in the 
United States.  Intelligence relating to terrorism is rarely adequate, detailed, or 
timely so it is paramount that Indications and Warnings (I&W) and Open Source 
Intelligence (OSINT) are given the highest level of attention.  The bottom line is 
addressing perceived vulnerabilities through these intelligence triggers is more 
beneficial than waiting for a warning through the intelligence community.  These 
intelligence triggers apply to worldwide trends and are often more beneficial than 
current intelligence.  Terrorists may broadcast their intentions to terrorize the 
United States, and Chertoff has stated the IED is the terrorist’s weapon of choice.  
With that intelligence as a starting point, I&W and OSINT are likely the best 
opportunity of gathering information that can help the United States prevent an 
IED terror campaign.  Since OSINT does not require security clearances, it 





1. I & W and OSINT 
The current method for obtaining and distributing open source intelligence 
and indications and warnings relating to IEDs is though TRIPwire.  “TRIPwire 
(Technical Resource for Incident Prevention) is a secure, online information-
sharing network for law enforcement, bomb squads, and other first responders to 
learn about current terrorist bombing tactics, techniques, and procedures, 
including improvised explosive device (IED) design and emplacement.”68  In 
addition to sharing tactics, techniques, and procedures, TRIPwire combines 
“expert analysis and reports with relevant documents, images, and video 
gathered directly from terrorist sources, to help homeland security professionals 
anticipate, identify, and prevent bombing incidents.”69  The network provides 
“near real-time information on improvised explosives and IEDs, relevant news, 
and threat alerts.”70  The network was launched in 2007 by the Office for Bomb 
Prevention (OBP) in DHS so there is expert validated information with federal 
level oversight.  TRIPwire is an excellent start in sharing and distributing 
intelligence triggers on current IED trends, however, there appears to be several 
issues with the concept and the handling of intelligence triggers in the United 
States.   
The first issue concerns what type of I&W and OSINT is being broadcast 
on TRIPwire.  TRIPwire is a technical resource, but if the network was designed 
to prevent explosive incidents DHS must be willing to post more than technical 
I&W and OSINT.  There are several I&W and OSINT factors not being broadcast 
on TRIPwire (such as criminal activity as a precursor to terrorist activity, 
indications of recruitment efforts and radicalization, and the movement towards 
self financing) because they are not technical in nature.  There are a number of 
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indications and warnings as well as OSINT that are less than technical in nature 
but can assist in preventing the threat and they too must be posted on TRIPwire.  
A failure to monitor and distribute all available indications and warnings and 
OSINT whether learned from foreign states or derived for the U.S. specifically 
provides an incomplete view of the threat which can have disastrous results.   
The second issue with TRIPwire and the distribution of intelligence 
triggers is the fact that the network is only available “to members of the bombing 
prevention community.”71  Without doubt there are certain pieces of intelligence 
that should only be available to the bombing community, however, the vast 
majority of indications and warnings and OSINT should be available to personnel 
outside of the bombing community.  One of Chertoff’s points was the importance 
of the private sector in preventing the IED threat.  The private sector controls 
around 80% of the critical infrastructure in the United States but because they 
are outside of the bombing community the private sector is not privilege to 
indications and warnings or OSINT on TRIPwire.  The situation is unsatisfactory 
and needs to be improved. 
At the very least the indications and warnings shared with an individual 
can depend on where they exist in the level of prevention.  The average U.S. 
citizen should be aware of likely targets and the methods of delivery.  Law 
enforcement personnel should be cognizant of criminal activity as a precursor to 
terrorist activity, the radicalization of criminals in prison, and the social 
networking aspect of recruitment in addition to what the average citizen should 
know.  State officials should be tracking developments across the country and 
internationally as well as feeding information and intelligence from the local level 
up.  The national level should be tracking old I&W and developing new I&W 
through constant OSINT monitoring.   
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C-IED efforts must utilize the intelligence triggers I&W and OSINT more 
often and effectively and determine the appropriate distribution for this 
information.     
B. INTERNATIONAL AND INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
Recommendation – The United States federal agencies must 
increase international and interagency cooperation. 
Without interagency and international cooperation, there is little chance 
the U.S. can prevent an IED terror campaign.  Currently America is not doing well 
in this area.  International cooperation is valuable for providing lessons learned, 
current trends in foreign countries, and disrupting future plots.  Interagency 
cooperation is essential in sharing what was gained from exercising international 
cooperation, gaining access to DoD level resources to combat IEDs, and 
addressing the threat in general because there is no single agency capable of 
preventing an IED terror campaign. 
International cooperation is necessary for the United States to learn the 
tactics of IED attacks and C-IED efforts of foreign countries that have been 
subject to IED campaigns as demonstrated by the case studies in Chapter III.  
Many of the details about the London bombing, Madrid bombing, and Israel’s 
struggle are available using open sources, but international cooperation allows 
for a more specific analysis of the circumstances.  Not only are specific details 
about recent IED attacks helpful to the United States, the experience gained by 
these countries over the past decades combating IEDs is valuable.  America 
must retrieve and digest as much of the C-IED history of foreign countries as 
possible through communicating and cooperation.  Anything less is putting the 
United States that much further behind in preventing an IED terror campaign.   
International cooperation is also necessary to analyze current trends of 
potential IED threats and recent attacks in foreign countries in a timely manner.  
The current trends of potential IED threats would not be adequate using open 
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sources, so international cooperation is critical.  The single most important 
aspect of analyzing current trends of potential IED threats is the time factor.  
Receiving the trends of potential IED threats in Germany two weeks in the wake 
of an attack in America does not provide much benefit.  International cooperation 
would not only allow the United States to provide security for the homeland, it 
would likely increase security for the foreign countries America is cooperating 
with.   
Programs initiated by the New York Police Department (NYPD) show 
there are issues with international cooperation between America’s federal 
agencies and foreign countries.  The NYPD has liaison officers in select cities 
around the world that monitor terrorist activities in these countries and the region.  
After a terrorist attack, the liaison officer acquires the details of the event and 
forwards the information to the NYPD counterterrorism bureau where a report is 
quickly drafted with the information provided and the implications for New York 
City.72  Initiatives like this by the NYPD demonstrate the lack of confidence New 
York City has in international cooperation of U.S. federal agencies with foreign 
countries.  If the FBI, CIA, or DHS were effectively communicating with foreign 
countries and providing information to State and local authorities in a timely 
manner, initiatives like NYPD SHIELD would not be necessary. 
Obviously international cooperation and partnerships exist which is 
evident with the disruption of the plot to explode airliners heading to the United 
States from England in mid-2006, but the level of cooperation is still not where it 
needs to be.  The level of cooperation must go beyond confirmed high level 
threats; the level of cooperation must transcend down to sharing potential threats 
as well.   
International cooperation is absolutely critical, but interagency cooperation 
within the United States is even more so.  There are two specific reasons 
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interagency cooperation is necessary.  First, there is no single agency in the 
United States with the resources to prevent an IED terror campaign.  Second, 
U.S. authorities have jurisdictional boundaries and terrorists do not. 
No single agency in the United States poses the resources necessary to 
prevent an IED terror campaign.  Low level state and local authorities are 
especially under resourced to prevent the IED terror threat.  Interagency 
cooperation would allow lower level authorities’ access to DoD C-IED assets.  
The best time to locate and use DoD C-IED assets is not in the aftermath of an 
attack or terror campaign.  The communication and cooperation needed to 
prevent this from occurring must take place before the attacks. 
Each agency in the United States has its own duties and responsibilities 
providing certain services.  Throughout the government and law enforcement in 
the United States there are jurisdictions.  Individuals are experienced at what 
they do inside those jurisdictions but are not very good about communicating 
across jurisdictional boundaries.  While America has jurisdictions, terrorists do 
not and they use it to their advantage.  It is no secret that interagency 
cooperation and communication is not what it needs to be, but it is improving.  
The attacks on 9/11 provide an excellent example of the importance of 
interagency cooperation, the need to effectively communicate, and the 
ramifications of a failure to do so.  The 9/11 commission report addresses the 
“Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide” in an effort to improve 
international cooperation because a failure to achieve such could result in 
another catastrophic attack.73  The value of interagency cooperation is best 
demonstrated using the following notional example.   
Al Qaeda releases a video clip showing IED attacks in Iraq and says, 
“Soon America will taste this in the U.S.”  Cars are reported stolen in 
Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio.  Homemade explosives are suspected of 
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being engineered in Delaware.  A prison in New Jersey suspects inmates are 
being recruited for terrorist activity.  These are criminal activities in separate 
states, but with interagency cooperation these activities can be viewed as 
possible precursors to an IED threat.  Without different agencies sharing 
information there is nothing to stop the cars from being driven to Boston where 
they are equipped with the homemade explosives from Delaware and provided to 
four recently paroled terrorists from New Jersey.   
International and interagency cooperation is absolutely critical in 
preventing an IED terror campaign in the United States.  Foreign state assistance 
and cooperation is a force multiplier in the fight against IEDs and the nature of an 
IED threat extends across every U.S. jurisdiction.  Without increasing the 
effectiveness of U.S. international and interagency cooperation terrorists will 
continue to operate within those seams and they will be successful.   
C. IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS 
The single most important aspect of the recommendations offered is that 
the recommendations can be immediately implemented.  A new domestic C-IED 
task force is not necessary, although new analytical jobs may be needed at key 
seams to monitor and distribute IED information over existing systems.  The 
systems to monitor the IED threat already exists, as do the relationships required 
for international and interagency cooperation.  All that is required to implement 
the recommendations is a willingness to foster and nurture the systems in place.   
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ANSWERED 
1)  Have any terrorist or criminal organization shown interest in 
using IEDs in America? 
YES!  In past decades, domestic terror organizations such as the Animal 
Liberation Front (ALF), Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and members of the anti-
abortion movement not only showed interest in using IEDs in America, they used 
IEDs in America.  Today the greatest IED threat to America comes from Islamic 
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extremists who have broadcast their intentions to terrorize the United States.  
The IED is the terrorist’s weapon of choice.    
2)  What lessons can be learned and applied from instances of IED 
terror campaigns against other nations? 
The Britain, Spain, and Israel case studies reveal there are a number of 
valuable lessons from IED terror campaigns against other nations.  Some of 
those valuable lessons include detecting the radicalization of men and women; 
the varying demographics of terrorists and potential terrorists; the need to identify 
likely targets; the common use of peroxide based explosives; common methods 
of delivery; the overall experience of countries who have been battling the threat 
for decades; the concept of homegrown terrorists; the recruitment of criminals, 
especially in prison; criminal acts as a precursor of terrorist activity; the 
importance of cooperation between intelligence communities and law 
enforcement; the movement from fund raising, transfer, and spending (FRTS) to 
fund raising, and spending (FRS), also known as self financing; the ramifications 
of alienating a certain community; and the necessity to clamp down on chemical 
precursors to homemade explosives.   
3)  Should or can indications and warnings (I&W) and open source 
intelligence (OSINT) provide a significant piece of the answer to combating 
a domestic IED threat? 
YES!  Intelligence relating to terrorism is rarely accurate or timely so it is 
paramount that Indications and Warnings (I&W) and Open Source Intelligence 
(OSINT) are given the highest level of attention.  The United States government 
also believes indications and warnings and open source intelligence provide a 
large piece of the answer because of the launching of and confidence behind the 
TRIPwire network.  Addressing perceived vulnerabilities through indications and 
warnings and open source is more beneficial than waiting for a warning of an IED 
threat through the intelligence community. 
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4)  Would a domestic IED terror campaign be more likely or lethal 
without effective international and interagency cooperation? 
YES!  The terrorists responsible for 9/11 were able to live openly in the 
United States without being monitored, take flying lessons in the United States, 
hijack four commercial airliners, and crash all four of them because international 
and interagency cooperation was ineffective.  Executing an IED terror campaign 
in the United States today would be easier than preparing for a 9/11 type attack 
because flying lessons would not be required.  Besides increasing the use of 
certain intelligence triggers the only way to prevent or reduce the likelihood or 
lethality of an IED terror campaign in the United States is to increase the 
effectiveness of international and interagency cooperation. 
E. INSTILLING A SENSE OF URGENCY 
Terrorists have shown every intention they will continue to attack America.  
IEDs are already the weapon of choice by terrorist organizations in many 
countries.  Terrorists possess the capabilities necessary to manufacture and use 
IEDs.  Spectacular IED attacks and IED campaigns are occurring all over the 
world, it just has not happened in America, yet.  America will have a national 
election in a year’s time which will increase the country’s vulnerability and the 
likelihood of attack.  These facts should instill a sense of urgency, but also 
consider the following statements: 
"If terrorists initiated an IED campaign in America today, it could paralyze 
us."74  David Heyman, director of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. 
"Terrorists' use of IEDs cannot be extrapolated into anything other than a 
major threat to this country."75  Supervisory Special Agent Barbara Martinez, a 
senior official at the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group. 
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(accessed November 27, 2007). 
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“National coordination of IED prevention efforts is absolutely crucial.”76  Lt. 
Shawn E. Stallworth, a Michigan State Police detective and member of the 
National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board. 
“As we saw in London and Glasgow, Scotland, in June, this trend has 
already begun.”77  FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III. 
The IED threat is knocking on America’s door.  It remains to be seen if the 
United States government has learned the lessons of 9/11 and will take the 









                                            
75 "Chertoff's Gut Feeling ‘IEDs are Coming to America’."  
76  Spencer S. Hsu and Mary Sheridan, "Chertoff Warns IEDs a Rising Threat in U.S."  
77 Ibid. 
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